01679nas a2200229   4500000000100000000000100001008004100002260001200043653002000055653001500075653001600090653002400106653001600130100001900146700002100165700001500186245010300201300001200304490000600316520111300322022001401435       2012                            d  c2012-1110afalse positives10aincentives10amethodology10amotivated reasoning10areplication1 aBrian A. Nosek1 aJeffrey R. Spies1 aMatt Motyl00aScientific Utopia: II. Restructuring Incentives and Practices to Promote Truth Over Publishability  a615-6310 v73 aAn academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing. Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inflate the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives favor novelty over replication, false results persist in the literature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge accumulation. Previous suggestions to address this problem are unlikely to be effective. For example, a journal of negative results publishes otherwise unpublishable reports. This enshrines the low status of the journal and its content. The persistence of false findings can be meliorated with strategies that make the fundamental but abstract accuracy motive-getting it right-competitive with the more tangible and concrete incentive-getting it published. This article develops strategies for improving scientific practices and knowledge accumulation that account for ordinary human motivations and biases.  a1745-6916